A critical flaw undermines Western sanctions against Russia: the absence of clearly defined conditions for lifting restrictions. This structural deficiency, identified by the architect of US sanctions policy under President Biden, raises fundamental questions about whether international sanctions can function effectively when targeted individuals have no roadmap for compliance.
The Missing Element in Sanctions Design
Daleep Singh, who designed US sanctions on Russia during the Biden administration, identified in his January 2025 Atlantic Council speech that effective sanctions require “off-ramps”—clear articulations of what sanctioned parties must do to secure removal from designation lists. No current sanctions regime implemented by the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, Japan, New Zealand, or Australia incorporates such off-ramps for Russian designations.
This absence transforms coercive instruments designed to change behaviour into permanent punishment, raising serious questions about whether sanctions are not working precisely because they offer no incentive for compliance. When designated individuals cannot identify concrete steps toward delisting, the entire premise of sanctions as behaviour-modification tools collapses.
The Arbitrariness Problem Exposed by Legal Challenges
The fundamental arbitrariness of UK sanctions emerged in legal challenges by designated individuals. Eugene Shvidler, a dual US-UK national who lived in England for years before designation, has had all global assets frozen despite never being accused of any crime and publicly condemning the Ukraine invasion as “senseless violence.”
Shvidler’s designation rests on his historical association with Roman Abramovich and his former non-executive director role at Evraz plc, a FTSE-100 mining company. Nine of Evraz’s ten other directors resigned simultaneously in early 2022, yet none were sanctioned. Neither were BP directors, despite maintaining substantially larger Russian interests through joint ventures with state-owned Rosneft.
In his Supreme Court dissenting opinion, Lord Leggatt observed that 92 per cent of travel restriction sanctions targeted individuals who had never visited the United Kingdom. Internal Foreign Office assessments acknowledged individual sanctions produce “practically no impact within six months of their imposition,” suggesting designation decisions reflect political theatre rather than strategic calculation.
When Sanctions Become Permanent Punishment Without Trial
For UK nationals, consequences prove particularly severe. Had Shvidler been a Russian national, only UK assets would face freezing. Because he holds British citizenship, however, restrictions apply worldwide to every economic resource he owns. Designated individuals cannot use their own funds even for food without Treasury permission. As Lord Leggatt noted, this transforms designated persons into “effectively prisoners of the state.”
Why EU Sanctions Lack Incentive Structures
The permanent nature of EU sanctions creates additional complications. When Section 24 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act requiring ministerial review after three years was repealed in March 2022, it eliminated accountability mechanisms. Designated individuals now face indefinite sanctions with no clear path to delisting, no regular review, and no temporal limits.
Intelligence Squared debate participants noted that finding appropriate off-ramps proves extraordinarily difficult. Lithuanian and Ukrainian audience members expressed deep opposition to Russia receiving any economic benefits following settlement. This emotional dimension creates practical constraints on designing sanctions that could succeed through behaviour modification.
Are Russian Sanctions Working as Negotiating Leverage
Without off-ramps, sanctions cannot function as negotiating leverage. The European Union’s decision to “future-proof” sanctions by permanently blocking Russian gas pipelines removes significant negotiating incentives. By preventing any future Nord Stream contracts, Brussels eliminates a “carrot” that might incentivise Russian concessions.
Successful deterrence requires both credible threats and credible promises. When Western policy removes reward possibilities by making certain sanctions permanent regardless of Russian actions, it transforms sanctions into purely punitive measures rather than behaviour-modification tools. President Putin stated on 28 February 2022 that Russia regards sanctions as existential threats, which under Russia’s altered nuclear doctrine justifies potential nuclear response.
When Policy Tools Become Virtue Signalling
The risk that sanctions serve primarily as political messaging emerged in legal proceedings. When Transport Secretary Grant Shapps announced detention of the yacht Phi, the Court of Appeal found his statements “at best inaccurate, at worst misleading.” Such episodes suggest sanctions announcements sometimes prioritise domestic political consumption over strategic effectiveness.
What Evidence Suggests About Changing Course
The limitations of sanctions without off-ramps reflect broader questions about why sanctions on Russia continue despite mounting evidence of ineffectiveness. Tufts University found sanctions achieve intended objectives in approximately 34 per cent of cases globally, with effectiveness correlating strongly to highly targeted measures where behavioural expectations are clear and measurable.
Historical precedents indicate sanctions can contribute to policy objectives when integrated into broader diplomatic strategies. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment worked because it established explicit conditions for relief. Similarly, targeted visa sanctions on IRA leadership created pressure whilst maintaining diplomatic engagement and clear pathways toward resolution.
Rethinking Sanctions Architecture for Strategic Coherence
The structural absence of off-ramps reveals a fundamental tension between sanctions as punishment and sanctions as policy tools. Permanent sanctions with no removal conditions cannot incentivise behaviour change because they offer no reward for compliance. They risk becoming counterproductive by validating Russian narratives about Western hostility, eliminating diplomatic flexibility, and ensuring sanctioned individuals have no motivation to distance themselves from the Kremlin. Unless Western policymakers address this architectural flaw by establishing clear conditions for sanctions removal, the question of whether international sanctions work as foreign policy instruments will continue receiving negative answers based on observable outcomes.
